Sberbank Europe AG: SRB adopts resolution decisions for Slovenian and Croatian subsidiaries.

9. März 2022

Written questions concerning the single supervisory mechanism:
Brussels, 09.09.2022

 

Sberbank Europe AG: SRB adopts resolution decisions for Slovenian and Croatian subsidiaries

 

The European Union has responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine with swift and unprecedented sanctions, many of which have a severe direct or indirect impact on Russian credit institutions.

The SRB has confirmed the ECB’s assessment that Sberbank Europe AG in Austria and its subsidiaries in Croatia (Sberbank d.d.) and Slovenia (Sberbank banka d.d.) were failing or likely to fail due to a rapid deterioration in their liquidity situation due to “the reputational impact of geopolitical tensions”.

The SRB found that there was a public interest in resolving the two subsidiaries in order to protect financial stability and avoid disruption to the Croatian and Slovenian economies and decided that no resolution action was necessary for the Austrian parent. As a consequence, the SRB adopted two resolution schemes providing for the application of the sale of business tool for the Croatian and Slovenian subsidiaries.

 

1. Why has SRB decided to apply only the sale of business tool on the resolved entities and not bail-in that would allow the write down of shareholder and creditor claims including those of the Russian parent?

 

2. Given that the SRB effectively decided to transfer all shares of Sberbank d.d.to the Croatian Postbank Hrvatska Postanska Banka (HPB) that is largely a state owned bank with the ownership stake of the Republic of Croatia amounting to 74,5% of HPB’s share capital, will the SRB disclose the details of the envisaged transaction?

 

3. Based on the latest available consolidated financial statements, the German branch of Sberbank Europe AG collected EUR 719 million in deposits. As the German branch is legally part of the Austrian parent holding company, the deposits taken on via the branch in Germany are covered by the Austrian deposit guarantee scheme. Given these implications on deposit protection across the Banking Union, what lessons can be drawn for the design of the overall system including the establishment of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)?